





























The JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS is a joint publication of the Friedrich 
Schiller University and the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany. 




Friedrich Schiller University Jena  Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3  Kahlaische Str. 10 
D-07743 Jena  D-07745 Jena 
www.uni-jena.de   www.econ.mpg.de 
 
© by the author. 
 
 
















We investigate whether the supply of venture capital (VC) is driven by 
spatial proximity between a VC company and the portfolio firm. Our 
analysis is based on information about VC investments in Germany 
between 2004 and 2009. We find that possible problems caused by the 
geographic distance to a portfolio firm seem to be overcome by 
syndication of investments with one of the VC firms located close to the 
investment. Our analysis does, however, suggest that short geographic 
distance between an investor and the investment has an increasing effect 
on the probability for syndication as well as on the number of firms that 
join the syndicate. Hence, local VC suppliers may assume a role of an 
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A sufficient supply of capital is a crucial precondition for entrepreneurial 
activity, and equity capital, particularly venture capital (VC), is especially 
important. VC can be essential for the emergence and survival of young 
and innovative start-ups, which usually have severe problems accessing 
other means of financing. Consequently, there is widespread concern that 
regional disparities exist in the supply of VC, which may lead to an “equity 
gap” in certain regions (see, e.g. Martin et al., 2005; Mason and Harrison, 
1992). This concern is based on two assumptions. First, in some countries 
such as the US and the UK,  suppliers of VC are clustered in just a few 
locations and are largely absent in other regions. Second, it is assumed 
that the emergence and successful maintenance of a VC partnership 
requires certain spatial proximity between the VC investor and the 
investment. If this assumption is realistic, start-ups may suffer from a 
shortage of equity in those regions where no or only a few VC companies 
are located. It is the combination of regional clustering of VC firms and the 
need for spatial proximity for VC investment that may cause a regional 
equity gap, which then creates a barrier for innovative start-ups in the 
respective regions. 
 
This paper investigates the role of spatial proximity between VC 
suppliers and their portfolio firms in Germany. We particularly focus on the 
ability of German VC companies to overcome problems of geographic 
distance by means of syndication; i.e. sharing an investment with other 
investors (Wright and Lockett, 2003). Our main argument is that if 
investors can find syndication partners that are located geographically 
close to an investment, the investment’s distance as well as the distance 
                                            
1 We gratefully acknowledge comments of three anonymous referees on an earlier 
version which have been very helpful in improving this paper. 
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between the syndication partners will be of only very minor concern. If our 
argument holds, then the importance of geography for VC investment 
rests on two pillars: first, the importance of having a VC firm located close 
to the investment for the formation of a syndicate, and second, the 
demand-side of the VC market, that is, the number of innovative start-ups 
that emerge in a region. This does, however, not imply that geography is 
completely unimportant. As far as spatial proximity of one of the 
syndication partners to an investment is conducive to syndication, regional 
VC suppliers may assume a role of an ‘anchor,’ connecting the regional 
economy to more distant parts of the industry. The results of our empirical 
analysis will reveal whether VC firms do enlarge their spatial range of 
operation by syndicating investments and whether there are, indeed, 
regional equity gaps for innovative start-ups in Germany. From a policy 
perspective, this is an important point regarding questions such as “Is a 
lack of VC firms in a region an impediment for entrepreneurship and 
innovation there?” and “Can special problems of accessing VC in certain 
regions be regarded as a justification for policy makers to support regional 
VC development?” 
Earlier research has analyzed the role of geographic distance 
between VC firms and their investment targets for the US and the UK.
2 
These studies have shown that VC companies and their portfolio firms 
tend to be located in close proximity to each other, suggesting that 
geographic distance plays a crucial role for VC investment. This finding, 
however, may at least partly result from the relatively high geographic 
concentration of innovation activities and VC firms in these countries 
(Powell et al., 2002; Martin et al., 2005). If most of the innovative firms are 
clustered in one or in some few regions, it should not be surprising also to 
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find most if the VC companies in the same regions investing mainly in 
ventures which are located nearby. Hence, the role of geographic distance 
for VC investments can hardly be investigated if investments in companies 
which are located far away only rather seldom occur. Therefore, countries 
with a considerably more decentralized spatial structure in terms of 
innovative entrepreneurship such as Germany may be much better suited 
to investigate the role of geographic proximity for VC investment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first give a 
brief overview of the German VC market, particularly the spatial 
distribution of VC firms and potential investments (Section 2). Section 3 
provides a literature review of the main arguments suggesting that spatial 
proximity may play an important role for VC investment. After introducing 
the data (Section 4), we discuss possible reasons for geographic proximity 
in VC investments (Section 5). The results of the empirical analyses of the 
importance of spatial proximity for VC investments and for syndication of 
these investments are presented in Section 6. We conclude by 
summarizing our results and discussing their implications (Section 7). 
2  The spatial distribution of VC companies and their potential 
targets in Germany 
The German VC market is considered to be less mature than for example 
the VC markets in the US or in the UK. The first German VC company, the 
Deutsche Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft, was founded in 1975 (Becker 
and Hellmann, 2002) and until the mid-1990s only a handful of further 
firms existed. For comparison, the first US and UK VC firms were set up in 
the 1940s – the American Research and Development Corporation 
                                                                                                                         
2 For the US, see Sorensen and Stuart (2001), Powell et al. (2002), Florida et al. (1991), 
and Leinbach and Amrhein (1987). Main studies for the UK are Mason and Harrison 
(1999, 2002), Martin (1989), and Martin et al. (2005). 
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(Gompers and Lerner, 2005, 8) and the Industrial and Commercial 
Finance Corporation which later became 3i (Frommann and Dahmann, 
2003). Since the mid-1990s, however, the German VC market developed 
from a very immature sub-segment to a more and more important part of 
the financial service industry. Today, according to the European Venture 
Capital Association, it is the third largest European market in terms of 
capital invested – closely following France and considerably behind the 
UK. The German market is regarded as still having large upside potential 
which can be seen in a relatively low share of investments in total GDP 
(EVCA, 2008). The share of start-ups which received early stage VC in 
Germany is, however, quite comparable to the UK and the US.
3
Compared to the UK and the US (Martin et al., 2002; Powell et al., 
2002), German VC firms are much more geographically dispersed. Figure 
1 shows the regional distribution of members of the German Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association, which comprises nearly all German VC 
suppliers, private and public, i.e. under governmental influence. The 
circles indicate the number of VC companies.  The larger the circle is, the 
 
                                            
3 In Germany less than 400 start-ups appeared to be sufficiently promising to Venture 
Capital investors to receive first-round financing in 2007 (BVK, 2008, 9; European 
Venture Capital Association, 2008, 144). Taking the total number of start-ups in Germany 
as recorded in the ZEW Founder Panels to be about 266,000, this is only three out of 
every 2,000 new businesses. For the USA and the UK, the two nations with the most 
advanced VC industries, these shares are even lower. According to the 2009 Yearbook of 
the US National Venture Capital Association (2009, 11, 31), the number of new-
businesses receiving first-round VC financing in 2008 amounted to 1,179.  Compared to 
the more than 2,000,000 new companies set up in the United States each year (Shane, 
2009), this makes one out of every 2,000 new businesses. The British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA, 2009, 12) reports 269 early stage investments in the UK during 2008. 
Assuming the UK had about 250,000 start-ups that year, then the share of VC-backed 
new businesses is about one in a 1,000. A problem in calculating such ratios is that the 
information on the overall number of start-ups may not be comparable between countries. 
In particular, there are considerable differences between countries with respect to the 
inclusion of small-scale start-ups, such as firms with no employees or part-time 
entrepreneurship, which may make a considerable share of the overall number of new 
businesses. 




Figure 1:   The spatial distribution of VC firms and R&D intensive start-ups 
in Germany 
greater the number of VC companies located in that district is.  Business 
angel networks are represented by black quadrats. The greatest numbers 
of German VC suppliers are located in some larger cities that can be 
regarded as commercial centers: Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Dusseldorf, 
Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart. VC firms can, however, also be found in 
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smaller cities such as Bonn, Dresden, Erfurt, Jena, and many more. 
Although there are no VC suppliers in a number of regions, there is always 
at least one VC supplier located up to 200 kilometers (km) away, which is 
below the critical distance of a lead investor to an investment assumed for 
the US (e.g., Florida and Kenney, 1988; Sapienza et al., 1996). 
The regional distribution of the average yearly number of R&D 
intensive manufacturing start-ups which can be considered potential VC 
investments, the demand-side of the VC market, deviates quite 
considerably from the distribution of the VC suppliers (figure 1).
4
3  VC syndication — General rationale and spatial aspects 
 The 
innovative start-ups show a geographically rather dispersed structure with 
no obvious clustering and occur even in areas where no or only few VC 
firms are located. 
Many, if not most VC investments, include more than one financier 
(Lerner, 1994; Brander et al., 2002), i.e. the VC providers form a so-called 
syndicate. The partners of such a syndicate all have a stake in the 
portfolio company but may perform different tasks (Wright and Lockett, 
2003). These tasks range from being an active lead investor responsible 
for monitoring of and consulting with the financed firm, to that of a passive 
co-investor whose main contribution is the money invested. Possible 
motives for syndication are risk-sharing (Lockett and Wright, 2001), 
mobilizing larger amounts of capital (DeClercq and Dimov, 2004), and 
                                            
4 The figures pertain to the average number of start-ups in innovative manufacturing 
industries per year in the 2000-2008 period. The classification of innovative industries 
follows Grupp and Legler (2000). The data are based on the Foundation Panels of the 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. We are greatly indebted 
to the ZEW for making the data available.  
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gaining additional expertise for the evaluation of possible target firms
5
Research has shown that VC investment in innovative new firms 
typically takes place in several successive rounds which may be spread 
over a number of years (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Sahlman, 1990). The 
reasons for syndication of VC investments as well as the challenges for 
the investor may vary considerably depending on the stage of the 
investment process (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). In the early stages of an 
investment such as the evaluation of potential investments, investors 
might be less reliant on syndication partners as compared to later stages 
because capital requirements at the beginning of an investment process 
tend to be relatively low (DeClerq and Dimov, 2004). Furthermore, the 
older a portfolio firm becomes, the more additional and specific knowledge 
it might need from the investors. Finally, the VC firms that join an 
investment at later stages can benefit from the insights of the earlier 
investors what may help to reduce their risk (Lockett and Wright, 1999, 
 as 
well as for the necessary monitoring and consulting services (Manigart et 
al., 2006). By means of syndication, different VC firms can combine their 
resources; namely, their specific knowledge and capabilities (DeClercq 
and Dimov, 2004). Syndication may also help to reduce the costs of these 
activities. If, for example, the syndication partners are located at different 
geographic distances from the investment, the VC company which is 
based closest to the portfolio firm can take responsibility for those 
monitoring and consulting tasks that need to be performed on-site. In this 
way, the more distantly located syndication partners may benefit from the 
cooperation in terms of lower overall travel costs for supervising the 
investment (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008). 
                                            
5 In this regard, having an independent evaluation of the portfolio firm by another VC 
company may be an important motive for syndication. 
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2001). Therefore, the more mature an investment is, the more VC firms 
might participate in a syndicate. 
The role of regional proximity in the supply of equity for young and 
innovative start-ups has been the subject of intense discussion in the 
literature.
6
Empirical studies have found that in many countries VC companies 
are densely clustered in space (see Section 2). In the United States, for 
example, VC suppliers are heavily concentrated in certain areas on the 
east and west coasts (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001; Powell et al., 2002; 
Florida et al., 1991; Leinbach and Amrhein, 1987). In the United Kingdom, 
home of the largest VC market in Europe, VC suppliers are highly 
concentrated around London and in the southern part of the country 
(Mason and Harrison, 1999, 2002; Martin, 1989; Martin et al., 2005). 
Martin et al. (2002) also found a certain degree of spatial clustering of VC 
 The geographic distance between a VC company and a 
possible target firm can influence the financier’s investment decision in two 
ways. First, it may affect the search and identification of potential 
investment targets due to distant-related constraints in the spatial diffusion 
of information about these targets (Green, 1991, 23; Zook, 2002). Second, 
geographic distance may shape the amount of transaction costs that is 
expected to be necessary for monitoring and supervising the financed firm, 
activities that can be time consuming and even, at times, require face-to-
face interaction (Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Sapienza and Gupta, 
1994; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Hence, the cost of this interaction 
should increase with the geographic distance between the VC firm and the 
investment (Mason and Harrison, 2002; Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). 
                                            
6 See, e.g. Florida et al. (1991), Fritsch and Schilder (2008), Gupta and Sapienza (1992), 
Martin et al. (2002, 2005), Mason (2007), Mason and Harrison (2002), Powell et al. 
(2002), and Sorensen and Stuart (2001). 
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suppliers in France and Germany. However, this concentration was not as 
pronounced as it is in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
In addition to the geographic distribution of VC suppliers, some 
studies have investigated the role of spatial distance between VC 
suppliers and their investments, which may be an important determinant of 
the regional availability of finance for young and innovative companies (for 
an overview, see Fritsch and Schilder, 2008, and Mason, 2007). If 
proximity between the investor and the financed firm is important or even 
necessary to ensure sufficient management support and control so as to 
make the investment profitable, the geographic scope of a VC company’s 
activities will be limited. In an attempt to determine the most efficient 
geographic range of activity for VC investors, Zook (2002) arrives at a 
critical distance of a one-hour trip for VC companies in the Silicon Valley 
while Florida and Kenney (1988) believe 150-250 miles as critical distance 
for lead investors in the US. Sapienza et al. (1996) result in an average 
travel time of about 1.5 hours for VC investments in the UK and more than 
2 hours for the US. However, these results relate to the extremely 
geographically concentrated VC markets in the UK and the US and may 
not apply for countries with a less pronounced clustering of innovative 
start-ups such as Germany. If spatial proximity is important for a profitable 
relationship between an investor and the financed firm, and if VC suppliers 
are more or less geographically clustered, there might be a regional 
undersupply of VC in those areas where no or only few VC companies are 
located. 
One way VC companies can overcome the problem of large 
geographic distance from an investment is through syndication (Sorensen 
and Stuart, 2001). Based on an interview survey of German VC providers, 
Fritsch and Schilder (2008) found strong evidence that syndication can, at 
least partially, be used as a substitute for regional proximity. If one of the 
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syndication partners is located close to the investment, it can perform the 
required monitoring and consulting at less expense than a more distantly 
located company. The co-investors then can assume more of a passive 
role (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Wright and Lockett, 2003). If this 
hypothesis is correct, syndicated investments can be located at a greater 
geographic distance from the VC companies than non-syndicated 
investments can if at least one of the syndication partners is located 
relatively close to the portfolio firm. Therefore, we may expect that 
investors that are located far away from an investment will search for 
syndication partners located close to the portfolio firm to perform the 
monitoring and consulting activity, not neglecting other aspects of finding 
suitable co-investors such as its available capital, its track record, or its 
industry expertise. Hence, the geographic distance between at least one 
of the syndicate’s VC companies and the financed firm should be relatively 
small. 
Since the advantage of syndication will depend on the difference of 
geographic distances to the investment between two potential syndication 
partners, the probability for syndication can be expected to be the higher 
the larger this difference is. This reasoning implies that the geographic 
distance among syndication partners should be largely unimportant. It is, 
however, important for the regional availability of VC to have at least one 
supplier located not too far away who could act as an ‘anchor,’ thereby 
connecting the regional economy to more distant parts of the industry by 
means of syndication. Thus, geography may, indeed, matter for regional 
VC investment, but mainly for one of the investors who is forming a 
syndicate. 
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4  The database 
Our analysis is based on a data set of German VC investments at the 
micro level. The data are provided by VC facts, a company that collects 
information on German VC activity (VC facts, 2004-2009). We use data for 
the years 2004 to 2009, which include information on VC investments, 
ranging from 133 to 257 investments per year. This number is about 40 to 
60 percent of the aggregate annual number of early-stage investments 
recorded by the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(2009).
7 There is a clear concentration of investment in certain industries 
quite similar to the sectoral pattern of the investments recorded by the 
German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2004-2009): 
more than one-third of the investments are in the life sciences, a bit more 
than 10 percent are in software-related businesses as well as in the 
communication industries and in medical technologies. Investments by 
foreign VC companies which have an office in Germany are also 
included.
8
For the purposes of this paper, we focus on detailed information 
about the location of an investment as well as that of the investors, the 
number of investors involved, the total amount of money invested, and the 
age of the financed company. Based on the information about the location 
of the VC firms and of their investments, we are able to calculate the 
traveling distances between an investor and a portfolio company by car 
using the Internet-based route planner map24.de. 
 We have no indication for any misrepresentation of overall VC 
investment activity in our sample. 
                                            
7 The market data from the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association are 
not available at a company level. 
8 Foreign investment of German VC companies is not contained in the data. 
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Of the 1,240 VC investments in the sample, 911 (73.5 percent) are 
syndicated, i.e. there is more than one investor involved. The number of 
links between investors and the investment in a syndicate equals the 
number of syndication partners. For example, in a syndicate with two 
investors, there are two links, one between each investor and the portfolio 
company. We can identify 3,016 such pairs in the data. Due to several 
missing values, most of our analysis is based on a minimum of 819 and 
826 of such pairs. The missing data mainly concerns addresses of 
informal VC investors and of foreign VC firms that do not have an office in 
Germany; hence, these investors are not included in the analysis. 
Furthermore, certain governmental investors that merely act as passive 
co-investors or only give guarantees have been excluded. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
deviation 
Age of portfolio 




28.8  20.0  1.0  481.0  31.6 
Total amount of 
capital invested 
(million €) 




4.4  4.0  1.0  17.0  3.2 
Geographic 
distance to VC 
company (km) 
232.4  148.0  0.0  868.6  230.2 
Table 1 sets out descriptive statistics for the sample. All figures refer 
to the point in time when the investment was made. On average, the 
financed companies were slightly younger than four years old and had 
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about 30 employees. The average amount invested per financed company 
was about 8.4 million Euros. On average, the number of investors in a 








>700km 700km 600km 500km 400km 300km 200km <100km
Number of investments within
a certain distance (km)  
Figure 2: Spatial distances and travel times between VC companies and 
portfolio firms 
Since our main interest is to analyze the role of spatial proximity 
between VC investors and portfolio firms, we focus on the distance 
between these two parties. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the spatial 
distance between the VC companies and their portfolio firms in kilometers. 
We find that around 44 percent of the investments are located within a 
distance of 100 kilometers to their investors and less than 56 percent are 
within 200 kilometers. This means that almost half the VC investments are 
located more than 200 kilometers away from the investing VC firm. Given 
a dense network of roads and railway connections in Germany, the travel 
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times between two locations are highly correlated with the distance in 
kilometers (see Achleitner et al., 2009).  
These findings give first indication that regional proximity to an 
investment is not as important for VC firms and portfolio companies in 
Germany as is widely believed. Furthermore, these figures suggest that 
regions located far away from clusters of VC suppliers might not be at a 
severe regional disadvantage in obtaining equity for young and innovative 
companies. 
5  What influences the distance between VC firms and their 
investments? 
There are two main characteristics of an investment in our sample that 
may influence the distance between a VC company and its portfolio firm: 
the age of the portfolio firm and the amount of capital invested. A young 
company in the early stages of its technical and organizational 
development that does not generate much turnover or profit is likely to 
require more guidance and supervision by the VC firm than a company in 
a later stage of its lifecycle (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). This hypothesis 
is based on the assumption that a lack of business and management skills 
may be a particular problem in young innovative companies which are 
often run by engineers or natural scientists, many of them not having 
much business experience (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). Furthermore, 
young and innovative companies face a relatively high degree of 
uncertainty in regard to the technical and economic success of their 
projects (Sapienza et al., 1996). Therefore, the monitoring and supervision 
required from the VC supplier may be more time consuming and 
considerably more expensive during earlier developmental stages of the 
portfolio firm than at later stages. Thus, spatial proximity between the VC 
company and the portfolio firm is expected to be more important for early-
stage investments (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). 
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The size of the investment in terms of overall capital invested may 
also influence the degree of consulting and monitoring provided and, 
therefore, the importance of regional proximity in two possibly 
contradictory ways. First, the larger the investment, the higher the 
expected profit is (Martin et al., 2005). Hence, VC companies will be 
willing to invest more effort and resources to ensure the success of a 
project involving a large investment as compared to a smaller one. 
Because of a higher expected return of a large investment, the investor 
can also more easily afford the higher transaction costs incurred in 
monitoring and advising a portfolio firm that is located far away. Therefore, 
regional proximity between VC suppliers and financed firms may be less 
important for larger investments. Second, larger investments pose a 
greater risk for VC companies (Robinson, 1987; Robbie et al., 1997). The 
danger of incurring a relatively high loss if a large investment fails may 
motivate VC investors to undertake greater efforts of monitoring and 
advising in order to reduce such a risk of failure. This might have 
implications for the importance of spatial proximity because monitoring 
and advising is easier when the investment is located nearby. Given these 
different lines of argument, it is not entirely clear how the size of an 
investment affects the importance of proximity. Taking a first look at our 
data, we find that the correlation coefficient for the relationship between 
the size of the investment measured by the total amount of capital 
invested and the distance to the investment is rather small and statistically 
insignificant (Table 2). 
The correlation coefficient between the age of a financed firm at the 
time of investment and geographic distance between the VC company and 
the portfolio firm is also very small and not statistically significant (Table 
2). This result may partly be explained by the age composition of the 
sample. More than 83 percent of the portfolio firms in our data set were 
less than six years old at the time of investment. Since nearly all the 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 069  
 
16 
investments are at an early stage of development and not in bridge or 
turnaround stages, they may be characterized by similar requirements for 
consulting and supervision.
9
To reveal the distance-related benefits of syndication in one variable, 
we calculate the difference between the geographic distance of a VC firm 
to an investment and the distance of the syndication partner located 
closest to the portfolio firm. The larger this difference is, the more 
advantageous the syndication is: at least if the partner located closest to 
the investment provides the monitoring and consulting. This is confirmed 
by the significantly positive correlation of the “distance to investment 
./
. 
minimal distance to investment” variable with the number of investors per 
investment (Table 2; last row). A VC firm with a low value of this indicator 
is located close to the investment and has only a weak distance-related 
incentive to syndicate. The negative correlation of this difference within a 
syndicate and the minimal distance (Table 2) indicates that the search for 
a syndication partner located close to the investment is more important for 
those investors that are located farther away. The more distant a VC firm 
is from an investment, the longer the distance to the syndication partner 
located closest to the investment is. This clearly shows that it is not of 
crucial importance for syndication partners to be located close to each 
other. What is important, however, is that a least one of the investors is in 
close spatial proximity to the portfolio firm. 
 Not surprisingly, the amount of an investment 
is positively correlated with the age of the investment (Table 2).  
                                            
9 We do not have reliable information about the stage of an investment but have to use 
the age of the portfolio company as a proxy assuming that there is a strong correlation 
between a company’s age and the stage of an investment. 
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Table 2:  Correlation coefficients of variables regarding syndication and 
the distance between VC company and portfolio firm 
    1  2  3  4  5 
1  Number of investors  1.00         
2  Age of portfolio 
company (years)  0.25**  1.00       
3  Total amount of capital 
invested (million €)  0.62**  0.21**  1.00     
4  Distance to specific 
investment (km)  0.03  0.01  0.05  1.00   
5  Minimal distance to 
investment (km)
a  -0.26**  -0.06**  -0.08*  0.56**  1.00 
6 
Distance to investment 
./
. minimal distance to 
investment
 a 
0.27**  0.06*  0.13**  0.67**  -0.24** 
Notes: 
a Syndicated investments only. ** Statistically significant at the 1%-level; * 
Statistically significant at the 5%-level; Number of observations: 826. 
 
The greater the number of investors, the closer at least one of the 
investors will be to the investment. Furthermore, there is a pronounced 
positive correlation between the minimal distance within a syndicated 
investment and the distance between an individual VC company and the 
portfolio firm. This indicates that the farther away the investment is 
located, the greater the distance of the closest investor to the portfolio firm 
is. However, this positive correlation is a statistical artifact arising from the 
method used to calculate the minimal distance and has no meaningful 
interpretation.
10
                                            
10 Since the distance of a VC firm to the investment cannot be smaller than the minimum 
distance of the investor that is located closest to the investment, the observations all lie 
either in the upper-right part or in the lower-left part of a scatter plot of these two variables 
 There is no statistically significant relationship between 
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the geographic distance to a portfolio company and the number of 
investors. 
A positive correlation between the age of the investment, which 
indicates its stage, and the number of investors (Table 2) suggests that 
investors in later stages tend to syndicate more often than at an earlier 
stage. The slightly negative statistical relationship between a portfolio 
company’s age and the minimal distance to a member of a syndicate can 
be regarded as an indication that older investments are more likely to have 
a member of a syndicate located close to the portfolio firm. This might be 
due to higher needs for on-site involvement for investors during later 
developmental stages of a venture.  
6  The role of syndication in regional VC supply 
6.1  Syndicated versus non-syndicated investments 
Comparing the mean values of a number of variables between the sub-
samples of syndicated and non-syndicated investments (Table 3) leads to 
further insights. We find that syndicated investments are, on average, 
nearly three times larger in terms of the total amount of capital invested. 
The age of a syndicated investment which indicates its stage is on 
average slightly and significantly higher than the average age of a portfolio 
company with a single investor. This suggests a greater probability of later 
stage investments to be syndicated. Closer inspection shows that the 
share of portfolio firms with only a single investor is about 28 percent 
                                                                                                                         
(distance to specific investment and minimal distance to investment). Because of this 
type of distribution, a simple correlation coefficient must assume a positive value. 
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among the young firms(between 0-4 year old) but only 20 percent among 
the firms which are older than 4 years. 
Table 3:  Independent samples t-test for comparing investments with a 
single investor and syndicated investments 
   









































investments  95.40  1,641 
Notes:
 a Company level ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent-level; * Statistically 
significant at the 5 percent-level. 
 
The average distance of a VC company from a syndicated 
investment is not significantly greater than that of a single investment, 
whereas the minimal distance of one of the firms in a syndicate is on 
average shorter than the distance of a single investor. For syndicates, the 
average minimal distance between the syndication partner located closest 
to the investment and the portfolio firm is less than 100 kilometers (Table 
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3) while single investors are on average located 217 kilometers away from 
the portfolio firm. These results suggest that VC companies located far 
away from the portfolio firm tend to syndicate their investments with at 
least one of the syndication partners that is located relatively close to the 
target firm. 
Table 4: The effect of spatial proximity on the probability of syndication 
(logit estimations)  
  Probability of syndication 
  I  II 






Total amount of capital 





Geographic distance to 
investment (km) 
0.0001 
(0.05)  – 
Minimal distance to 
investment (km)
 a  –  -0.0031* 
(5.32) 




Log likelihood  -219.00  -206.55 
Pseudo R-squared  0.065  0.121 
Notes: Asymptotic t-values in parentheses; 
a Company level ** Statistically significant 
at the 1 percent-level; * Statistically significant at the 5 percent-level; Number of 
observations: 819 and 826 
 
These interpretations of the correlation analysis and the t-tests are 
confirmed by multivariate logistic and negative binomial regressions 
(Tables 4 and 5). The two models in Table 4 show the results of the logit 
estimations regarding the influence of the distance between a VC 
company and the portfolio firm on the probability of syndication. The 
dependent variable is the syndication dummy, which assumes the value of 
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1 if an investment is syndicated and a value of 0 otherwise. According to 
the estimates, the age of the portfolio company has no statistically 
significant effect on the probability of syndication, whereas the probability 
of syndication rises with the amount of capital that is invested. This 
indicates that it is more the capital requirements and the desire for risk 
sharing than the stage of an investment that determines syndication. 
The results for Model I in Table 4 clearly show that the distance 
between a VC company and a portfolio firm has no significant effect on the 
decision to syndicate. However, when substituting the distance variable by 
the minimal distance between one of the syndication partners and the 
investment (Model II), this minimal distance has a significantly negative 
influence on the probability of syndication. Although this effect is of low 
magnitude – a ten kilometers increase of the minimal distance lowers the 
odds ratio by three percentage points – , it shows that the probability of 
syndication increases with the spatial proximity of one of the syndication 
partners to the investment. To include the distance and the minimal 
distance into one model does not lead to meaningful results because the 
pronounced correlation between the two variables causes severe 
multicollinearity problems. Furthermore, it is not possible to include the 
spread between the distance of the VC firm to the portfolio firm and the 
minimal distance of the syndication partner located closest to the 
investment into the model because this predicts the outcome perfectly. 
This result is due to the fact that this spread is zero for all solo investments 
and positive for all syndicates; therefore, a spread of zero has a 
syndication probability of zero, whereas a positive spread has a probability 
of syndication of 1. 
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Table 5:  The effect of spatial proximity on the number of syndication 
partners (negative binomial regressions)  
  Number of co-investors 
  I  II
  III 
















Geographic distance to 
investment (km) 
0.0001 
(0.02)  –  – 
Minimal distance to investment 
(km)
 a  –  -0.0015** 
(9.08)  – 
Distance to investment 
./
. 
minimal distance to investment
 a 
–  –  0.0008** 
(6.55) 






Log-likelihood  -1,949.9  -1,921.76  -1,929.0 
Pseudo R-squared  0.066  0.086  0.076 
Notes: Asymptotic t-values in parentheses; 
a Company level ** Statistically significant 
at the 1 percent-level; * Statistically significant at the 5 percent-level; Number of 
observations: 819 and 826. 
 
Similar results are achieved when the number of co-investors 
involved in a syndicate is taken as the dependent variable (Table 5). We 
employed negative binomial regression as the estimation method due to 
the integer character of this variable. The relationship between the size of 
the syndicate and spatial variables is a further indicator that syndication is 
often used to overcome problems of geographic distance to an 
investment. Like the probability of syndication, the number of co-investors 
rises with the overall size of the investment and is only slightly affected by 
the age of the portfolio company. Furthermore, there is no effect of the 
geographic distance of an investor to the location of the investment on the 
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size of a syndicate in terms of the number of VC firms involved (Model I). 
However, the minimal distance between one of the investors and the 
financed company has a statistically significant impact on the number of 
co-investors (Model II). If one of the investors is located close to the 
investment, the other VC companies can exploit this regional proximity to 
reduce possible problems of geographic distance. 
We may further our argument by assuming that the geographic 
distance between a VC company and a portfolio firm could have a special 
influence on the decision to syndicate if it is possible to have one of the 
syndication partners located fairly close to the investment. The spread 
between the geographic distance to an investment and the minimal 
distance of one syndication partner can be regarded as an indicator of 
such an advantage of syndication. The significantly positive coefficient for 
this measure (Model III in Table 5) confirms this hypothesis. According to 
the estimation results, the number of co-investors increases with the 
spread between the distance of a VC company to a portfolio firm and the 
minimal distance in a syndicated investment. This supports the hypothesis 
that proximity between the investors is of minor importance compared to 
spatial distance to the portfolio firm.  
6.2  Are follow-up investors different from initial investors? 
Our data do not contain information that allows us to identify the lead 
investor of a syndicate. Such information could be important because the 
role of regional proximity and the use of syndication for overcoming the 
problem of distantly located investments may be different for an actively 
involved lead investor as compared to passive co-investors. Furthermore, 
our data do not allow us to determine which investor in a syndicate has 
initialized the investment. However, our sample covers six years, and we 
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can identify several rounds of investment for 247 out of the 3,016 pairs of 
investors and portfolio firms in this period. We performed additional 
analyses of these investments that include several investment rounds, i.e. 
the VC firms invest in the portfolio firm in different years, attempting to 
reveal possible differences between VC firms that have been involved at 
earlier investment stages and those investors which joined an investment 
later on. If syndication is a means to overcome problems of geographic 
distance to a portfolio company, follow-up investors may benefit from 
spatial proximity of VC firms which are already involved in the investment. 
Hence, syndicates that have one investor already located close to the 
respective investment might be particularly attractive to join. 
Table 6: Follow-up investors versus initial investors  
  Type of 




Age of portfolio 
company (years) 
Early 




round  4.94  247 








round  14.26  131 


















round  86.92  247 
Notes:
 a Company level; ** statistically significant at the 1 percent-level; * statistically 
significant at the 5 percent-level. 
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A t-test that compares follow-up investors with initial investors 
reveals considerable differences between both groups. Unsurprisingly, the 
target companies tend to be older at the time follow-up investors join the 
syndicate. Moreover, the amount of money invested in a follow-up round is 
larger (Table 6), which is probably due to higher capital requirements of 
older portfolio companies. The significantly larger average distance of 
follow-up investors to a specific investment clearly shows that these 
follow-up investors tend to be located farther away from the investment 
target than the initial investors. In detail, affiliating an additional investor to 
an existing syndicate leads to a decrease in the minimal distance in 76 out 
of 247 cases. This is consistent with the conclusion drawn from our 
analysis in the previous section (section 6.1) that syndication is used to 
overcome the problems of distantly located portfolio firms, i.e. follow-up 
investors tend to join syndicates that already have an investor that is 
located close to the portfolio firm. Accordingly, the distribution of spatial 
distances between follow-up investors and portfolio firms differs from the 
distribution in the overall sample (see Figure 1). For example, only 34 
percent of the follow-up investors are located up to 100 kilometers away 
from the investment while this share amounts to 44 percent in the entire 
sample. This finding is supported by a considerably smaller minimal 
distance that we find for investments with additional follow-up investors as 
compared to initial investors. 
Overall, the results of our analyses strongly suggest that syndication 
is used as a measure to overcome the problems involved with geographic 
distance between a VC company and the investment; although, other 
reasons for syndication such as the capital requirements and the desire for 
risk-sharing may still play an important role. The probability of syndication 
does not increase solely due to large geographic distances between the 
VC company and the portfolio firm. Location has an impact on syndication, 
particularly, if one of the syndication partners is located relatively close to 
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the investment. This effect is even more pronounced for follow-up 
investors that prefer to join syndicates with one investor already located 
close to the investment.  
These findings indicate that the supply of VC in a region can be 
multiplied by way of syndication even if there are only few VC companies 
located in that region. Thus, a dense regional cluster of VC firms might not 
be necessary in order to make capital available for young and innovative 
companies. However, in a syndicated investment, one of the investors 
should be located fairly close to the portfolio company. Therefore, it could 
be possible that there exists some kind of a ‘follow-up round’ equity gap in 
regions with no VC suppliers at all. However, given the average minimum 
distance of 94 kilometers to the closest VC investor in a syndicate, and 
217 kilometers for investments with a single investor (see Table 4), the 
actual occurrence of such an equity gap in Germany appears quite 
unlikely given the spatial distribution of VC suppliers (Figure 1). 
Accordingly, interviewed managers of German VC firms nearly 
unanimously stated that geographic distance does not shape their 
investment decision (Fritsch and Schilder, 2008). 
7  Conclusions and policy implications 
We have investigated the role of geographic distance between VC firms 
and investments on the regional supply of VC in Germany. The German 
context may be particularly well suited for such an analysis because of the 
country’s rather decentralized spatial structure. Innovative start-ups and 
VC firms are not as highly clustered in space in Germany as is the case in 
the US and in the UK. If such a high spatial concentration of innovative 
start-ups induces co-location of VC firms, then investments into distantly 
located companies may hardly exist or arise only in special cases, for 
example, with portfolio firms that require specific knowledge of VC 
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investors that is not available in the region or if a portfolio firm requires 
extraordinarily large amounts of capital. Our analysis in the German 
context shows that geographic distance between a VC company and a 
potential investment plays only a minor role and that syndication can be a 
means to overcome distance-related problems. Hence, the high levels of 
spatial proximity between VC companies and their investments that have 
been found for the US and the UK cannot necessarily be considered proof 
that spatial proximity is of crucial importance for VC investment, but rather 
may mainly result from the spatial structure in these countries. 
We confirm the results of an earlier interview-study (Fritsch and 
Schilder, 2008) by showing that regional proximity between a VC company 
and a portfolio firm is fairly unimportant for VC investments in Germany. 
Based on our data (about 1,240 VC investments in Germany between 
2004 and 2009), we find evidence that the regional supply of VC is largely 
independent of the location of an investment. The average distance 
between investor and investment is more than 232 kilometers, and 44 
percent of the investments are made in locations that are more than 200 
kilometers away from the financier. 
We have shown that syndication is frequently used by VC firms to 
overcome the problems inherent in investments located far away. The 
more closely one of the syndication partners is located to the portfolio firm, 
the more likely it is that several VC firms will share the investment. We 
also find a positive relationship between spatial proximity of a VC firm to 
an investment and the number of co-investors involved in a syndicate. 
This suggests that an investment of a VC firm located in close proximity 
will be able to attract more syndication partners than an investment where 
the minimal distance to a member of the syndicate is relatively large. This 
effect is even more pronounced for follow-up investors that prefer to join 
syndicates in which one of the early-movers is already located close to the 
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investment. Furthermore, the probability of syndication rises with the 
amount of capital invested. The age of the portfolio firm, which can be 
regarded as an indicator of the investment stage, does not have significant 
effects on the probability of syndication. 
According to our results, the question if a regional equity gap for 
young and innovative start-ups exists in Germany has to be answered with 
a “no” and a “yes.” “No” because geographic distance of an investment to 
a VC company does not seem to be an important impediment for VC 
investment as such. VC firms do invest in distantly located firms, and they 
may use syndication with other VC suppliers which are located closer to 
the investment as a means of overcoming the spatial proximity. “Yes” 
because if a VC firm located close by is conducive for the formation of a 
syndication, then regions with no supplier within a certain distance may, 
indeed, have problems attracting the financial resources they need. 
According to our results, the absence of VC suppliers in a region may 
particularly lead to some disadvantages with regard to the financing of 
larger investments that require the involvement of several financiers. In 
practice, even the most remote German regions have a VC supplier 
located not farther than 200 kilometers away, which lies within the critical 
distance for a lead investment as identified in studies for the US. Even if it 
may be slightly more difficult to attract VC investments in some regions, 
this can hardly be regarded as a severe obstacle to entrepreneurial and 
innovative activity. 
These results fall in line with previous work on regional VC supply 
that has hypothesized that possible geographic disparities of VC might be 
due to demand-side effects such as differences in the number of potential 
investments, entrepreneurs’ limited awareness of VC or even their 
aversion towards participation of external investors (for an overview, see 
Christensen, 2007). Therefore, from a policy point of view, promoting the 
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establishment of regional VC markets will not solve the problem of 
undesirably low levels of innovative entrepreneurship. Hence, other 
avenues for effectively stimulating the emergence of innovative, new 
businesses in a region need to be chosen. 
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